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European Union Regulation of Competition for Investment:
Lessons for North America
Kenneth P. Thomas

Abst:::-act: With: the approval of NAFTA, the Canadian, Mexican and
U.S. economies will become more tightly integrated than ever
before.
The removal of tariff barrie-rs means t:hat governments
will lose an important policy instrument. At t:he same time, this
change will magnify the importance of {inancial and fiscal.
incentives to attract investment, as one of the few instruments
of international commercial policy that will still be available
to the three governments. The recent decision by the state of
Alabama to provide over S250 million in incentives for Merqedes
to locate a new factory in Tuscaloosa illustrates the dilemmas
policymakers face because of the lack of regulation over
investment attraction within North America.
In the European
Union, by contrast, control over state aid to industry derives
from the Treaty of Rome. and is enforced by the European·
Commission.
This pap~r evaluates the success of EU efforcs in restricting
investment incentives.
It argues that these efforts represent
significant cooperation among member states which have been
successful, albeit imperfectly, in reducing total state aids and
in controlling the potential for subsidy wars.
Finally, it
1
suggests that the EU s experience provides valuable lessons for
North American policymakers as they enter a new chapter of
continental integration.
A previous version of this paper was presented at the
Ihc.ernational Studies Association conference in Washington, D.C.,
March 29 ,. l.994.
I would like to thank the University of Missouri, Research Board and the University of_Missouri-St. Louis Summer
Research Fund f:or their financial support of' this research, and
Steve Chan, Ginny Haufler and Je£f Lantis for their comrnem::s,.

EU Regulation of State Aid to Industry:
Lessons for North America
With the approval of NAFTA, the .Canadian, Mexican and U.t:3.
economies will become ·more tightly integrated than ever before.
The removal of' tariff barriers means that governments will lose
an important policy instrument. At the same time, this change
wil+ magnify the importance of financial and fiscal incentives to
attract investment, as one of the few instruments of
international commercial policy that will still be available to
the three governments.
Investment incentives have been a
recurring sore point in Canadian-u.s; relations (particularly in
the automobile industry), and NAFTA's expansion of the market for
trade and investment will spread the potential for conflict in
this policy area.
The recent decision by the state of Alabama to provide over
$250 million in incentives for Mercedes to locate a new factory
in Tuscaloosa illustrates the dilemmas policymakers face because
of the lack of regulation over investment attraction within the
United States or between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico.
In the
European Union, by contrast, control over all forms of state.aid
to industry is enshrined in the Treaty of Rome and enforced by·
the European Commission.
This paper evaluates the success of EU efforts in
restricting investment incentives. Specifically, it examines the
efforts of the Commission of the European Union to regulate the
provision of state subsidies to industry and compares it with the
virtual lack of such regulation within North America, especially
in the United States.
It argues that these efforts represent
significant cooperation among member states which have been
successful, albeit imperfectly, in reducing total state aids and
in controlling the potential for subsidy wars. Finally, it
suggests that the EU's experience provides valuable lessons for
North American policymakers as they enter a new chapter of
continental integration.
This paper begins with the rationale for investment
competition, and shows that the use of subsidies by individual
governments is by no means irrational, as is sometimes claimed.
Instead, it is driven by the strategic situation (a Prisoners'
Dilemma) in which governments act. The theoretical solution is
for governments to cooperate to make all better off;
interestingly, the European Union has been more successful than

1

the United States despite the necessity for such cooperation to
· take place "under anarchy" in Europe, whereas third-party
enforcement of cooperation is available for U.S. states.
I then
describe the EU institutional procedures which make this
possible, as well as the early history of EU regulation of state
aid.
Next, I report on my preliminary findings as to the
effectiveness of these regulation efforts, and conclude with
their implications for policymakers in North America.

2

Competition for Inyestment: Structural Dependence ·Across Borders
·
Governments reiy on busines·s for economic activity to tax,
and for job creation. Without these:, they have neither :the .funds
to carry out their jobs, no_r an ~conomic performance that is
likely· to get them re-_E=lected .at the polls.· - Maintaining an·
adequate level-of investment is thug a prerequisite··for a
government meeting any other goals it might have. As a result,
government officials pay close- attention to the interests and
policy .views of the owner·s o.f capital. Lindblom calls this the
1
"privileged position" of business.
·This v·iew is also known as
the ." structural dependence" of. the state on capital~ perhaps ·best ·
formalized by Przeworski and Wallerstein. 2
Beca~se investors can ·act across jurisdictional boundaries, ··
governments at all -levels-local, state/provincial, -national, even
supra-nat:i,.onal in' the case of the· European -Union-must compete .,
with each other for their investment. This. competition can .be
either firm-specific or general, ar:id can take many .forms;
including tariff protection:, . cash grants,-. tax breaks, free 1a·nd
and infrastructure, training funds; low-cost financing,
repression. of labor organizations, and deregul~tion, ·among3
other_s .'
And as firtns are able· to. extend ·themselves
geographically to ·an ·increasing extent,_ i t i•ncreases the
potential-number of hosts for ,any.particular investment; which·
means the competition: for investment becomes-flercer:as firm
mobility increas~s.
,Examples of .such competition are everywhere. When I began
this research, St. Louis and Kansas·city 1 along with New York
1

Char les E . Lindblom, _,. .P_,_o,. ...
,l i,,_,t""1...· c"""""s__,.a....n,.,,d..,___,M
..........
a ·r...,k,.,,e._.t""'s~:--=T..,.h=e~W__,_o=r=l=d~'~s
Political-Economic ·systems (Ne\i/ York: Basic Boolcs, 1977), ·chapter
13.
2

Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein, "Structural
Dependence of the State on Capital. 11 American· Political S9ience
Review 82 (March 1988): 11-29.
3

Paulette Kurzer argues, for_example( that such deregulation
of capital markets has undermined the postwar class compromises of
Western Europe, even the· most corporatist __ of them;. -_See Business
and Banking: Political·change and Economic Infa~gration in Western
Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
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City, were competing to be the new headquarters of Trans World
Airlines, despite the fact that TWA was in bankruptcy and a risk
to cease operations without the eventual "winner" (St. Louis, as
it turned out) seeing much benefit from its investment.
The auto
industry has seen a number of such auctions, including Toyota,
Saturn, Isuzu/Subaru, Diamond·star, BMW, and Mercedes, among
others.
In one sense, this frantic scramble for investment is
irrational.
From·the point of view of Missouri unemployment, the
same number of jobs would have come to the state whether St.
Louis or Kansas City became the new TWA headquarters .. Yet the
two cities offered local incentives to go with the state's
incentive package.
From the standpoint of the United States as a
whole, it is.even more irrational. Not only would the same
number of jobs have been generated in New York City, Kansas City
or St. Louis, there are offsetting job losses at ·the company's·
former headquarters at Mt. Kisco, New York.
Thus, sub-national
governments prepared three. sets of investment incentives to
reward TWA for creating IlQ new jobs in the U.S.
From the standpoint of individual governments, however,
there is nothing irrational about their behavior. As Richard
4
Cooper and Stephen Guisinger 5 have argued, government
competition for investment is well modeled as a Prisoners'
Dilemma. All governments would be better off if they did not
offer investment incentives, but an individual government would
lose a significant amount of investment if it unilaterally ceased
to give location subsidies. This is obscured, however, by much
of the research on incentives, which claims that incentives are
"ineffective." As Guisinger shows, such conclusions are largely
.
6
based on rhetorical sleights-of-hand.
Guisinger's earlier
4

Richard N. Cooper, "Economic Interdependence and Foreign
Policy in the Seventies." World Politics 24, no. 2 (January
1972), pp. 159.-81, especially pp. 168-69. Cooper does not
actually use the term Prisoners' Dilemma, but his description of
the strategic situation facing governments is exactly the same.
5

Stephen E. Guisinger and Associates,. Investment Incentives
and Performance Requirements. New York: Praeger, 1985.

4

study, however, brought out the Prisoners' Di1emtna nature -of-the
situation quite nicely:
survey respondents· were asked if they
would have made their·investment in the same place without
inceritives, given that othei nations retained theirs.
Two~thirds
7
of the projects surveyed would have been,located elsewhere.·
Cooperation-With and Without Anarchy
Cooper strongly hinted in his 1972 article that the best
solution to the Prisoners' Dilemmas created by interdependence.
(one of which is competition for investment) involves government,
8
coordination of policj,.es.
Theoretical work on cooperation
s_uggests that for many .Prisoners' Dilemmas, the only reliabJ.e- way
to achieye cooperation is for an outside party to enforce.
9
agreements. . In domestic politics,--this normallymeans the
national government.
In international politics, there i~ no such
ultimate power to appeal to, hence the frequent description-of
10
international politic~- as an anarchic realin:·
To obtaih
cooperation-under anarchy, states· must fall back on more.fragile
methods-of obtaining cooperation such as-using long-term·
strategies to reward cooperators and punish non~cooperatbrs.
The U.S. and the EU both
have
·low level of internal··trade
.
.
barriers; combined with_their other economic similarities, this

-a

6

"Rhetoric and R-eal.ity in International Business: A Note -on
the Eff_ectiveness of Incentives·," Transnational Corporations,
Volume·1, no. 2 (August-1992), pp. 111-123.
7

Guisinger, "Summary and Conclusions," in Investment
Incentives and Performance Reqµirements, pp. 317-318.
8

.

.

Cooper, p. 179.

9

See, for example, Dennis.J.VIueller, Public Choice (Cambridge:
Cambridge Unive~sity Press, _1979) ,- chapter~ 2.
10

one important analysis of this distinction between domestic
and international politics is Kenneth N-. Waltz, Theory of
International Politics (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley,
1979), pp. 102~16. Charles Lipson also notes the importance of
this distinction iri "Internationa1·Cooperation in ·Economic and
Security Affairs," World Politics, Volume ?O{XVII, no. - 1 (October 1984), p. 4.
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makes them likely to see substantial competition for
11
investment.
The main political difference is that EU member
states are sovereign, whereas U.S. states are not.
Cooperation
among U.S. states could be enforced py the federal government; EU
member states have had to cooperate without external enforcement
of their agreements.
Given our theoretical understandings about
when cooperation is most likely, it is striking that the 12_
independent members of the European Union have been able to
cooperate to reduce investment incentives while U.S. ·states have
not.
The Situation in Europe
Policy makers in t_he member states of the European Union
have long understood that a subsidy in one country can export
unemployment to others. For this reason, provisions to control
subsidies to industry were written into both the Treaty of Paris
and the Treaty of Rome.
Indeed, regulation of state aid in
Europe goes beyond attempts to control location incentives to
footloose industries, but to any type of financial assistance to
firms.
While I am_ in particular interested in bidding for mobile
industry, the· case law that has developed regarding state aid of
all kinds is relevant for_ location subsidies.
The institutional arrangements for controlling state aid are
12
formalized primarily in the Treaty of Rome, Articles 92-94.
They give the European Co_mmission wide-ranging powers to· oversee.
13
and veto proposed state aids.
In general,· aid is considered to
be incompatible with the common market unless it qualifies for a
11

See Guisinger "A Comparative Study of Country Policies," in
Investment Incentives and Performance Requirements, pp. 14-19.
12

0ne of the best summaries of this is Despina Schina, State
Aids Under the EEC Treaty. Articles 92 to 94 (Oxford:: ESC
Publishing Limited, 1987). Except where noted, the following
paragraph draws on her·discussion, pp. 42-61.
13

This has been facilitated by the fact that there has been
little judicial intervention on state ai_d issues, except for
review of Commission actions. See Andrew Evans and Stephen
Martin, "Socially Acceptable Distortion of Competition: Community
Policy on State Aid," European Law Review 16, no. 2 (1991), p. 80.
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'Specific exemption, according to Article 92(1). Article 92(2).
specifies three types of aids which are consider·ed automatically
compatible.:
aid "of a. social character" provided to individuals,
natural disaster aid, ·and aid for areas of Germany affected by
its division (Berlin and areas bordering on East Germany).
_ Article 92 (3) specifies the sorts of subsidies which the
Commission can, at its discret-ion, approve· .as compatible with the
common market.
These are by far the most important of- the
derogations.
92(°3) (a) provides for aid to the poorest.areas of
the Community; 92(3) (b) for subsidies in the common European
interest or. to meet a·serious disturbance in a Member's economy.
Finally, sectoral subsidies or regional subsidies (for areas
lagging by natii:mal but not EU-wide standards) can be approved
under Article 92(3) (c). Article 93 provides the.general
requirement that states must notify the-Commission before
introducing state aids and that they cannot·i:mplement them until
they receive Commission approval. Article 94 empowers the
Council to make appropriate regulations.
Despite the Commission's formal power in the,area of-state
a~d, there was very little done with these powers·until the late
1960s and early 1970s. For instance, it was not until 1968 that
the .Commission introduced its first framewo~k for regional--aid.;
moreover, the Council of Ministers did not approve it until
14
October 1971, with an effective date of January 1, 1972.
·This
resolution first put into.place the idea of having regionally
differentiated maximum aid awards within the-community.
Similarly, although the Commission had established the power to
order repayment of illegal subsidies in a 1973 Court of Justice
ruling, it was not until ten years later that the Commission
15
announced that it.would begin using this sanction.
Slowly but
surely, however, a large body of Commission procedures and EU
case law has been built up on the treatment of state aid ..
The evolving history of EU regulation of state subsidies has
unfolded to a large extent through Commission initiatives and
through the European _Court of Justice.
In large part, this is
14

Schina, pp. 66-67. She argues (p. 172) that it was the
1970s recession which finally forced the Commission to take action
on state aid.
15

S c h'1na, p. 164 .

7

due to the incentive to defect. Since the Commission's role is
to police cooperation, disputes arise when it objects to a
proposed aid and cannot negotiate an agreeable solution with the
Member State. Such cases often end up before the Court of
Justice. Moreover, the easiest way to cheat is simply to not
notify the Commission of one's intent to grant a subsidy. This
is often done in the expectation that derogation for the aid
16
would not be granted.
Such· cases are even more likely to end
up before the Court, possibly more than once if the country in
question still does not comply with the Commission's order to
cease an aid.
Thus, as in any Prisoners' Dilemma, the ability to
17
monitor is a central issue in promoting cooperation.
States have also tried to escape the rules by shifting to
types of aid that are less regulated. Acco'rcf'ing to Gatsios and
18
Seabright,
one favored tack has been to give more aid as R&D
aid once the Commission came to look upon it more favorably:.
In particular the Commission became more sympathetic in the
1980s towards aids designed to stimulate research and
development, not least because of its concern to match the
technological advantages of the US and Japan. Not
surprisingly, state aid then began increasingly to take the
form of Rand D assistance, so that the Commission had to
intervene in 1985 and set a limit of 50 per cent of a
research programme for basic research, with a lower
percentage for more applied research.
The second issue to promote cooperation is credible
sanctions. As Gatsios and Seabright argue, for a sanction to be
credible and effective, it "must be large relative to the payoffs
of [the regulated] but small relative to the payoffs of the
16

James Flynn, "State Aid and Self-Help," European Law Review,
Vol. 8 (1983), pp. 307-308.
17

See Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and
Security Affairs," p. 7.
18

Konstantine Gatsios and Paul Seabright, "Regulation in the
European Community," Oxford Review of Economic Policy. Vol. 5, no.
2 (1989) I PP• 55-56.

8

regulators (since sanctions are typically costly for regulators
19
too) . "
They suggest that the Commission has been hampered .by
not having such sanctions available against-states which refuse
20
-•
to obey the rules.
As an example,.throwing Germany out of the
EU for not reducing its-regional aid program is certainly large·
enough to be effective, but it is also too large to be credible.
If states persist in ignori"ng Court orders to·cease aid or_to
recapture aid from firms that received it wrongfully, there has
been little the.Commission could do.
The Maastricht Treaty.may·
make- it possible to remedy this problem, as it will become
possible to· fine states which
·-do not -.obey Court orders ..
.
Substantively, the Commission has-arrived at a set of
standard views on different types of state aid. Regional aid is.
subject to varying maxima, depending on the levels of-GDP per
capita and unemployment in the area, with special consideration
also given to areas with political problems such .as Northern
Ireland._ Aid for declining sectors~ such as textiles, steel, and
shipbuilding, is now normally only approved·when·it is combined
with cutbacks in the industry's capacity. ,As in the recent steel
program, this .often requires reaching a Community~wide agreement
21
on the extent of the cutbacks for each country.
The
Commission_generally takes a favorable view of aids to small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and for research and development~
The Commission exercises its regulatory powers.through the
required notification procedure for aids, as well as monitoring
the press for unnotified subsidies. Once notified, the
Commission has two months to either approve the aid or open an
investigation.
(It can also take no action, but this is

19

Gatsios and Seabright, pp. 45-46.

20

Gatsios and Seabright, p. 56.

21

In December 1993, the Council of Ministers agreed to 6.79
billion 'ECUs in subsidies for six state~owned steel firms in
Italy, Germany, Spain ·and Portugal, in exchange for 5.5 million
tons of capacity reductions and steps toward_privatization _of the
firms. Martin DuBois, "EC Approves $7.66 Billion Aid Package in
Bid to Revive Sluggish Steel Industry," Wall Street Journal, 20
December 1993, p. A9A.

9
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relatively rare;)
If the Commission opens an investigation, it
will most likely require modifications of a subsidy program or
veto it entirely. 23 It is this oversight mechanism, an
institutional way to police cooperation among EU members; which
lends whatever control over state aid exists.
Of course, the proof is in the pudding.
The U.S. makes no
effort to control states and other sub-national governments from
bidding for business, while the EU has quite elaborate procedures
in place. Have these procedures succeeded, particularly in
regards to controlling aid to mobile investment?
Data problems
make this a difficult question to address.
The Commission does
not categorize aid in a way that identifies mobile projects, so
it is necessary to extract data from the State Aid reports.
According to Reinhard Walther, a statistical. expert in the
Directorate for State Aids, the types of aid most likely to go
for mobile investments are regional aid, aid for research and
24
development, and general aid.
Examining spending in those
categories confirms that overall spending potentially available
for mobile projects has decreased from the period of 1981-86
(First Survey) to 1988-90 (Third Survey),' as the Table 1 shows:
TABLE 1
SPENDING ON R&D, GENERAL AND REGIONAL AID (ANNUAL AVG)
EEC-10 FOR 1981-86, EEC~12 FOR 1986-90
MILLION ECUs
Type of

R&D
General
Regional
22S

Aid

1981-86
1986-88
1987 prices
3,035
1;913
13,078

3,330
1,508
12,030

1986-88
1988-90
1989 prices
3,730
1,689
13,474

3,627
1,084
13,401

c h'ina, . p. 145.

23

Fiona Cownie, "State Aids in the Eighties," European Law
Review 11, no. 4 (1986), pp. 247-67.
"Very few grants of aid are
approved by the Commission, once it had decided to initiate the
procedure provided in Article 93." p. 262
24

•
•
Interview
in
Brusse 1 s, 23 September 1993.
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Total

18,026

16,868

18,893

18,112

Sources: 1981-86 and 1986-88 at 1987 prices, ~ommission of the
European Communities, Second Survey on State Aids. (BrusselsLuxembourg, 1990), Table X, p. -31;
1986-88 at 1989 prices,
calculated by multiplying previous column by ratio of total state
aid expressed in: billion ECUs at· 1989 prices (Third Survey. Table
13, p. 38) and at 1987 prices (Second Survey. Table XI, p. 39),
which is 92. 3/82. 3 or 1.12; - 1988-90, calculated from Commission
of the European Communities, Third Survey on State Aids
(Brussels-Luxembourg, 1992), Annex Tables A4/1-A4/12.
As Table 1 shows, spending on these three categories Of aid
fell in rec!-1 ·terms by 6.4% from 1981-86 to 1986..:88, and a further
4.1% from 1986-88 to 1988~90. At a very gross level, then, this
suppo:rts the hypothesis that the Commission's intervention has
helped reduce competition for investment, though more work is
certainly needed.
Another type.of-evidence comes from industry studies.· In.a
previous work,· I examined all major Ford investments in ·the
United Kingdom from 1960 to 1986 . . Subsidies rose· from 10.7% of
the investment in 1960 for Ford UK Expansion Plan #3 to 82.2% for
the Brigend Engine Plant in 1977, but fell sharply·to 4.6% for
25
Brigend Engine #2 in 1988.
Whil~ the high figure for the first
Brigend plant is an outlier made possible by the large number of
bidders for this plant (seven), Nissan obtained a 20.5% grant for
an assembly ·plant in_ the inid--1980s (almost twi·ce as high as that
for Ford UK Expansion Plan #3, suggesting, in rriy view, that
producti·on mobility had undermined the - UK's· bargaining positionr,
while later entrants to the EU market (Toyota and Honda) ·avoided
26
gra~ts because of their distaste for Commission oversight.
25

Kenneth P. Thomas, Capital Beyond Borders : How Capital·.
Mobility Affects Bargaining Between Firms and_States, unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, _March 1992, chapter 5.
26

Telephone interview- with Prof. D. G. · Rhys, Urii versi ty of
Cardiff, 4 October 1991. He attributed the.decline in British aid
offers after the mid-1980.s. partly to CoTI1mission pressure. and
partly to the Thatcher government's own desire to reduce regional
aid.
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While this is only one industry, this result also suggests that
the Commission has had some success in reducing competition for
27
investment per se.
Explaining European success
The U.S. has seen virtually no cooperation in controlling
location subsidies, and the major attempt that· was made failed.
Several Midwest U.S. states tried to implement a "no raiding"
policy with respect to firms located in the cooperating states,
but the recession of the early 1980s brought a rapid end to this
effort. 28 Why has Europe been more successful?
Most importantly, the European Union has a mechanism to
monitor and enforce the implicit cooperative agreement of the
Treaty of Rome. While Brussels does not have as much power over
Member States as the U.S. federal government does over its
states, in the U.S., nothing has been done to turn that potential
into reality~ Moreover, while the federal governm~nt has been
very critical of investment incentives in trade negotiations,
other countries readily point out that U.S. states give quite
29
handsome subsidies themselves.
Indeed, there is often a
federal element to the packages given to companies by designating
30
their plants a foreign trade sub-zone.
Second, the number of states involved may have played a
role.
Since Olson's The Logic of Collective Action, we expect
that cooperation will be more difficult to achieve as the number
27

By contrast, investment incentives for automobile projects
in Canada and ~n several U.S. states (Illinois, Missouri, and New
York) showed continuous incr~ase from the 1960s through the 1980s.
See Thomas, Capital Beyond Borders, chapter 5.
28

Michael Gauf, "In the Midwest, It's Every State for Itself,"
st, Louis Post-Dispatch, 2 December 1992.
29

·

See, for example, John M. Kline, State Government Influence
in U.S. International Economic Policy (Lexington, Massachusetts:
D.C. Heath and Company, 1983), pp. 78-82.
30

James Rubenstein, The Changing U.S. Auto Industry: A
Geographical Analysis (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp.
217-18.
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31

of actors rises.
The Treaty of Rome was signed by only six
countries, and there were still only six mempers when the.
Commission began implementing its rules.on·state aid.
The U.S.,
of ~ourse, has 50 states. This could account for the difficulty.
in achieving agreement. However, since the relationship of the
federal government to the states is hierarchical, there is no
need to gain state approva,l to have a uniform policy .. As with
raising the drinking age from 18 to 21, the federal government
could use financial tools to ~orce states to adopt restri6tionson location incentives ..
Finally, while EU Member States have an incentive to defect,
they· at least agree on the need for avoiding bidding wars .. · By
contrast, there is no agreement on this principle in the United
States, .either at the state or federal level. This is so despite
the embar_rassment state. policies of investment . attraction cause .
the U.S. in trade negotiations. Why this has been the case is
still, ·to·my mind, an open question.
Conclusion
With the approval of NAFTA, it may well be time for
advocates of restrictions on incentives to .:focus on a North
32
American, rather than a U.S. , agreement to. do this. · By
operating· at the . level of . the three national governments, . the
Prisoners' Dilemma of investment att-raction can be made much more
tractable. ·.It.will be necessary to reach agreement not only on.
what is and·is not an acceptable subsidy, but also to establish a
monitoring and enforcement mechanism.
The difficulties of achieving this should_~ot be
underestimated.
For example, if incentives are allowed in lessdeveloped r~gion~, as is.the case in Europe, ail of 'Mexico will
be eligible for the highest levels of awards. This will be seen
by critics of the agreement as a further means by which jobs will
31

Mancur Olson, . The Logic of Collective Action: Public ··Goods
and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1971) , p. 35.
32

Two such advocates are Robert Reich, "Who Is Them?" Harvard
Business·Review, March-April 1991, pp. 77-88,. and Barbara Jenkins,
The Paradox of Continental Production (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1992).
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be exported from Canada and the United States to Mexico. Again,
this points to the difficulty'of integrating economies as far
apart in development levels as those in North America, in
comparison with those in Europe, especially the original members
of the EEC.
Nevertheless, it is possible for this type of regulation to
succeed in the context of North American competition for
investment.
Indeed, with levels of state ownership low in the
U.S. and falling in Canada and Mexico, it is conceivable that it
could be more successful here than in Europe.
The reason is that
the most difficult monitoring and enforcement problems come with
state-owned firms, and their relative paucity in North America
33
reduces the potential for such difficulties~
However, the
relatively larger state sectors in Canada and .Mexico could cause
conflict, mirroring EU debates over differing approaches to state
intervention in the economy, which have largely pitted Southern
34
vs. Northern Member States against each other.
If that occurs,
it would slow progress in controlling location incentives. Still,
the European example shows that such problems are not
intractable.
NAFTA will cause new challenges to governments' economic
policy not least.because of the remoyal of tariffs as an
instrument of policy. One important consequence will be the
increased importance of subsidies to industry, especially when
used as location incentives., As shown above, the European Union
has made substantial progress in controlling state aid, and its

33

According to former Competition Commissioner Sir Leon
Brittan, the worst offenders in terms of non-notification are
state-owned firms, which had 15 billion ECUs of unnotified aid
from 1986-90. More recent Commission estimates suggest that the
ECU value of non-notified aid is ten times greater for state-owned
firms than private companies. See David Gardner, "EC loses state
aid case: Court rules against closer public sector scrutiny,"
Financial Times, 17 June 1993, p. 2. On enforcement problems, see
Gatsios and Seabright, pp. 56-57.
34

Schina, p. 177, remarks on the frequent difficulty of
getting cooperation on state aid issues between monetarist and
social-democratic governments.

14

methods for doing so should be strongly considered in the North
American context.
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